Loewenstein, George: Exotic Preferences: Behavioural Economics and Human Motivation by Ross, Sandy
www.ssoar.info
Loewenstein, George: Exotic Preferences:
Behavioural Economics and Human Motivation
Ross, Sandy
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Rezension / review
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ross, S. (2008). Review of the book Exotic Preferences: Behavioural Economics and Human Motivation, by G.
Loewenstein. Sociologický časopis / Czech Sociological Review, 44(6), 1200-1205. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-65262
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 44, No. 6
1200
immediate gratiﬁ cation and understate the 
value of future pay-offs. This is often called 
‘hyperbolic discounting’ in the literature, 
but the real issue is excessive present-ori-
entation, which can occur just as easily 
with exponential, time-consistent prefer-
ences, as with hyperbolic, time-inconsist-
ent preferences. For instance, making re-
tirement saving the default arrangement 
can serve to counter the tendency to un-
der-save, which is itself a response to the 
overvaluation of current as compared to 
retirement consumption. A second justi-
ﬁ cation is the tendency for individuals to 
ignore low probability events, such as hav-
ing an automobile accident. I consider the 
irritating bell that sounds in my car to be 
a present pain that offsets the present pain 
of fastening my seatbelt, given that I can-
not really experience the pain of great bod-
ily injury with an inﬁ nitesimal probability 
0.00001. 
A second sort of libertarian paternal-
ism takes the form of having the govern-
ment require that ﬁ rms reveal with clarity 
and salience the full terms of a contractual 
agreement with consumers. For instance, 
it might be required that a restaurant print 
the nutritional content of its food on the 
menu, or that the precise interest rate on a 
mortgage be posted, or that all of a broker’s 
charges be itemised on a monthly state-
ment. These measures are ‘paternalistic’, 
because if consumers were fully aware of 
the situation, they might demand this in-
formation from ﬁ rms, and market compe-
tition would then lead to compliance. The 
role of the government in this situation 
would then be the more traditional one of 
enforcing ‘truth in advertising’ – ﬁ rms are 
not allowed to misrepresent their offerings. 
This form of social policy may also not re-
ally be paternalistic. If the transaction costs 
are high enough, I might tolerate the res-
taurant’s practice of not revealing nutri-
tional content, even though I would be 
willing to pay to have this information re-
vealed, but I would not be willing to pay to 
offset the restaurant’s revenue loss because 
I eat smaller portions of healthier food. If 
my unwillingness to pay is due to my ex-
cessive present-orientation, and if I recog-
nise this, I prefer the government regula-
tion for myself.
Thaler and Sunstein, like other behav-
ioural economic policy analysts, are widely 
criticised for their paternalism, which ﬂ ies 
in the face of free-market ideology. While 
some suspicion is warranted, the idea of 
a market economy with no governmental 
correctives is just a libertarian fantasy that 
people neither want nor with which they 
could comfortably live. Policies of the sort 
discussed in this volume are a welcome ad-
dition to the policy-maker’s toolbox. Liber-
tarian paternalism, of course, is not a pana-
cea. It will not replace the price system as 
the central mechanism for allocating goods 
and services, and it will not obviate the 
need for legislation that corrects market 
failures, such as the tendency for excessive 
energy use to undermine the natural envi-
ronment, and perhaps even partially off-
sets such ‘human frailties’ as the tendency 
to under-save and abuse illegal substances. 
However, libertarian paternalism is attrac-
tive as a ﬁ rst line of attack on even these 
problems and should be part of the policy-
maker’s toolkit.
Herbert Gintis
Santa Fe Institute and 
Central European University
hgintis@comcast.net
George Loewenstein: Exotic Preferences: 
Behavioural Economics and Human 
Motivation
Oxford 2008: Oxford University Press, 
671 pp. 
Behavioural economics, the marriage of 
insights from psychology and econom-
ics, has matured from a fringe interest of 
a small handful of researchers towards ac-
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ceptance in mainstream economics since 
the founding of the Journal of Behavioural 
Economics in 1972. The current ﬁ nancial cri-
sis and the publication of Dan Ariely’s pop-
ular best seller, Predictably Irrational [2008], 
have generated wider interest in this sub-
ﬁ eld amongst both lay readers and non-
economist academics. There is much that 
sociologists may learn from publications in 
this  area. Economic sociology tends to con-
struct a straw man out of economic theory, 
presenting an increasingly outdated view 
focused on utility-maximising homo eco-
nomicus as a contrast to a kinder, gentler, 
socially embedded and contextualised pic-
ture of economic activity. Instead of chal-
lenging this outmoded dichotomy, recent 
currents in sociology have moved in an-
other direction, towards, unfortunately, an 
uncritical stance, exempliﬁ ed by Callon’s 
[1998: 1] description of the market as ‘the 
abstract mechanisms whereby supply and 
demand confront each other and adjust 
themselves in search of compromise’. To 
downgrade the distinctive sociological im-
agination to a set of almost interchangeable 
bolt-on social contexts attached to textbook 
economic models would be to do a disserv-
ice to both disciplines.
Behavioural economics presents eco-
nomic sociology with a ﬁ ne opportunity, 
as it represents a fresh approach to eco-
nomic thinking that is explicitly formed 
and engaged with the social and personal 
aspects of economic life, such as relation-
ships between actors and things, emotion-
al states and the importance of temporal-
ity. So when George Loewenstein’s Exotic 
Preferences appeared in my mailbox, I was 
very enthusiastic. Regrettably, this senti-
ment waned in direct proportion to the 
number of pages read. Behavioural eco-
nomics offers the potential to generate in-
triguing discussions between the various 
disciplines that examine economic life – 
psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists 
and economists rarely sing from the same 
hymnal. But this book is not the place to 
begin for sociologists of either the quantita-
tive or the qualitative persuasion. A recent 
issue of the Journal of Economic Literature 
containing excellent papers by Rieskamp, 
Busemeyer and Mellers [2006], Fudenberg 
[2006] and Pesendorfer [2006] offers a bet-
ter introduction to the fundamental con-
cepts of the ﬁ eld, along with a good survey 
of recent and inﬂ uential work. 
For Exotic Preferences, Loewenstein se-
lected twenty-two of his previously pub-
lished papers and wrote prefatory essays 
for each one about the circumstances that 
inspired the research. These introductory 
passages, which can stretch to three or four 
pages, are some of the best reading in the 
book. Though the chapters are organised 
into six thematic sections – some of which 
are very broad, such as the second section, 
‘Social Preferences’, while others are ex-
tremely narrow, like section ﬁ ve, ‘Intertem-
poral Choice’ – the volume feels more like 
a ‘best of’ album from a rock band whose 
career has spanned several decades and 
musical styles than a coherent collection. 
This diversity is not necessarily a detri-
mental quality, as the wide-ranging nature 
of the papers is refreshing, given that edit-
ed collections are sometimes too narrowly 
and tightly scripted. Though a solid grasp 
of the mathematics of economic model-
ling is needed to follow the proofs in some 
papers, the contours of the argument are 
largely intelligible even without the equa-
tions. 
However, there are three chapters in 
Exotic Preferences that are of particular so-
ciological interest. The ﬁ rst of these is, co-
incidentally, the ﬁ rst chapter in the book, 
entitled ‘Because It Is There: The Challenge 
of Mountaineering. . . for Utility Theory’. 
This paper presents a refreshing challenge 
to the problem of utility theory by way of 
a discussion of mountaineering. Loewen-
stein contends that conquering the most 
challenging peaks satisﬁ es the human de-
sire for prestige (p. 11); ‘the almost ob-
sessive human need to fulﬁ ll [sic] self-set 
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goals’ (p. 14); demonstrates mastery (p. 18) 
and provides ‘meaning’ (p. 21), which he 
deﬁ nes as ‘a new perspective on life’. Un-
fortunately, this explanation for climbing 
mountains could apply equally well to any 
leisure activity of highly driven people, 
from Massively Multiplayer Online games 
like World of Warcraft to endurance sports 
such as marathon running. According to 
Stebbins [1992: 125], these qualities are key 
features of serious leisure activities such as 
singing in barbershop quartets. Although 
mountaineering is framed as an outlier 
by Loewenstein, an unusual and danger-
ous activity, the explanations offered for its 
attractiveness are not entirely original or 
convincing. In the preface to this chapter, 
Loewenstein (p. 4) recounts one of several 
negative encounters to this paper when it 
was presented at a conference on extreme 
sport:
In response to my assertion that moun-
taineering is largely driven by ego, and is 
in reality a matter of almost unremitting 
misery, one French skier (who among 
other amazing accomplishments, had 
climbed Mount Everest and then skied 
down) took me aside to tell me ‘no no, 
you have it all wrong. Eet ees not miser-
able, eet is wonderful – like making lu-
uv to a beautiful woman’. I had no doubt 
that he spoke from experience. Howev-
er, no one is going to persuade me that 
climbing into the ‘death zone’ holds a 
candle to some of the other pleasures 
that life has to offer.
With those words, Loewenstein not only 
closes his preamble, but also shuts out the 
French mountaineer and his critique. Ad-
mittedly, Loewenstein is not a sociologist 
and he did not set out on a phenomenolog-
ical inquiry into extreme mountaineering. 
His interest was explicitly an exploration of 
the challenge this risky and painful activ-
ity poses to utility theory. However, such a 
dismissal of criticism from an expert with 
unquestionable experience in the area by 
Loewenstein’s own admission would be a 
cause for re-evaluation for most social sci-
entists. Instead, Loewenstein simply prefers 
his own framing of the experience – he is an 
amateur climber – and expects the reader 
to do the same. Fortunately, the most valu-
able part of this chapter is not its analysis of 
mountaineering, but Loewenstein’s argu-
ment (pp. 24–25) that traditional notions of 
utility have been based upon consumption, 
and this restricted conceptualisation leaves 
out the very qualities that make some ac-
tivities meaningful and enjoyable. An ex-
panded notion of utility that included non-
consumptive factors is the ﬁ rst step toward 
overcoming what Loewenstein (p. 5) de-
scribes as a fundamental economic tautol-
ogy: ‘the observation that people choose 
what they prefer’. Utility has an almost axi-
omatic status in economics, and this partic-
ular article represents a rather bold re-ex-
amination that merits reading.
Equally valuable is the nineteenth 
chapter, a co-authored paper entitled ‘Risk 
as Feelings’. Inﬂ uenced by Giddens [1990, 
1999] and Beck [1992], sociological studies 
of risk have been set in a macro-social con-
text or as a side effect of modernity [Beck 
1992: 21]. The study of risk in economic soci-
ology is broadly organisational, concentrat-
ing on regulation, corporate behaviour and 
governance. Loewenstein’s essay provides 
an individualised view of risk by examin-
ing the process of decision-making with 
the goal of integrating the role of emotion-
al responses into current cognitively-orient-
ed models. Loewenstein and his co-authors 
(p. 574) propose a dual assessment of risk 
in which the cognitive evaluation of conse-
quences is enhanced and informed by the 
vividness of previous experiences, which 
they call the risk-as-feelings model. Accord-
ing to this conceptualisation, risk is not only 
assessed cognitively but experienced emo-
tionally. The authors (pp. 568–569) propose 
that the consequentialist model of risky de-
cision-making, in which anticipated out-
comes and subjective probabilities feed into 
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a cognitive process whereby decisions are 
made, does not adequately account for the 
vividness of emotional responses and emo-
tional states. They propose a more complex 
model (p. 574) in which individuals’ cog-
nitive evaluations and emotional respons-
es exert not only an inﬂ uence upon deci-
sion-making but upon each other – a viv-
id memory or experience of a car accident 
may change a person’s cognitive evaluation 
of the risks entailed in ignoring red lights 
or not wearing seatbelts. 
Loewenstein and his co-authors rely 
largely on the research of others to sup-
port the construction of the model, and 
the original empirical data gathered for 
the article is not very extensive – an exer-
cise with 115 college students where par-
ticipants choose whether to remain in a 
taxi whose driver is inebriated (p. 582). But 
the construction of the argument seems 
plausible. The authors suggest that their 
model could contribute to studies of pub-
lic perception of risk in hopes of increas-
ing ‘responsive[ness] to public attitudes 
and opinions’ by policy-makers – which 
would certainly complement established 
sociological research interests in regulation 
and governance. However, there are other 
intriguing applications and possibilities in 
the realm of everyday economic life. The 
risk-as-feelings model would be very rel-
evant to decisions about securing loans or 
credit, perhaps a study of ﬁ rst-time home-
buyers. Risk-as-feelings could also inform 
a study of economic migration.
Chapter seventeen, ‘The Red and the 
Black: Mental Accounting of Savings and 
Debt’, is a curious paper. Though the equa-
tions, contributed by Dražen Prelec, are 
sometimes more vexing than illuminat-
ing, there are several intriguing ideas that 
should inspire further investigation. The 
aim of the article was to examine the re-
lationship between the pleasure of con-
sumption and the pain of payment. A sec-
tion title from this chapter, ‘Prepayment 
and Other Strategies for Putting Cost out 
of Mind’, indicates the intended audience 
and uses for the article, and so it should 
not be surprising that its eventual conclu-
sions are geared toward marketing endeav-
ours and the improvement of payment sys-
tems. Although such analysis seems more 
relevant for marketing institutes and retail 
managers, scholars studying the structur-
ing of retail and shopping, that is to say, 
the way that corporations and organisa-
tions construct and understand the terms 
under which the strictly monetary aspect 
of consumption occurs, may ﬁ nd the chap-
ter’s recommendations of interest. The au-
thors also examine how debt is framed in 
the context of expenditures and consump-
tion over time and in relation to the mo-
ment of consumption (p. 496). They iden-
tify the decoupling of speciﬁ c debts from 
the experience of consumption which those 
monies were used to purchase as an impor-
tant source of aversion to or irritation with 
debts (p. 509). According to this analysis, 
using a credit card decouples the expend-
iture from the moment of consumption, 
lumping multiple sums into a generalised 
debt, which becomes extremely odious 
(p. 511). Though it is hard to quibble with 
the mathematical models proposed by the 
authors, the empirical evidence supporting 
this paper is tenuous at best – eighty-eight 
people polled at an airport about which 
debts they dislike most or least (p. 51); a 
short survey of forty-four university stu-
dents and forty-two people waiting at an 
airport; and an anecdote about a young 
married couple (p. 506). 
Loewenstein and Prelec also suggest 
that mental calculation of expenditures, 
or mental accounting, is subject to certain 
very interesting limitations. They suggest 
that converting currency functions in much 
the same fashion as buying token money: 
‘In a similar vein [to token payment sys-
tems], people often report that spending 
is easy in foreign countries, where the for-
eign currency feels like “play money”.’ 
The authors do not tell us who these peo-
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 44, No. 6
1204
ple are or to whom the reporting is often 
done. In the spirit of reasoning by imagi-
native anecdote, one might similarly sug-
gest that immigrants to a new country may 
ﬁ nd themselves engaged in continual cur-
rency conversion in order to make sense of 
relative prices, as the system of prices in 
the ‘play money’ of their new country is 
as yet unclear. I should say that this has at 
least been my experience, which was simi-
lar to those of several colleagues informal-
ly polled around the water cooler. Lucki-
ly, an ideal laboratory for testing the inﬂ u-
ence of currency conversion on the mental 
accounting of expenditures, savings and 
debts exists. Virtual worlds such as Second 
Life, where players buy virtual currency 
with real monies, present one such oppor-
tunity. Unlike the experience of the tourist, 
whose short sojourn requires only a limit-
ed familiarity with local economic life and 
money, or the immigrant who is required 
to adapt to a new monetary system and 
pricing regime, the resident of a virtual 
world moves back and forth between virtu-
al and real money, converting (or not con-
verting) prices from one currency to anoth-
er. Perhaps a study of mental accounting in 
virtual worlds would provide a reasonable 
testing ground for some of the ideas in this 
chapter.
There are several other engaging chap-
ters in Exotic Preferences, but a close reading 
of every paper would not be the best way to 
approach this text. The introductory com-
ments provide a reasonable overview of 
what follows and indicate whether there is 
any proﬁ t to be found by wading through 
the essay itself. For sociologists, both quan-
titative and qualitative, there will be some 
unsettling elements in the way Loewen-
stein and his collaborators conducted their 
research. Methodological quibbles are 
bound to occur when crossing disciplinary 
boundaries, as standards for good research 
and how it should be conducted vary be-
tween ﬁ elds owing in part to their different 
ontological and epistemological positions. 
We cannot expect that a qualitative anthro-
pologist in the ﬁ eld with the Big Men of the 
Trobriands, a sociologist examining pat-
terns of migration with cross-national data 
sets, and an economist attempting to make 
sense of the endowment effect will attend 
to similar types of phenomena in their re-
spective research settings, and so it is only 
reasonable that what is a well-known and 
accepted method in one area might seem 
messy or dubious to researchers in anoth-
er. However, certain laboratory studies and 
questionnaires referenced in Exotic Pref-
erences raise questions that are somewhat 
larger than these usual sectarian differenc-
es. In fact, Loewenstein (p. 439) admits on 
one count that he violated federal law in 
the distribution of one questionnaire and 
was saved from reprimands because the lo-
cal authority ﬁ gure who should have en-
forced the law was a student at the univer-
sity where he works. In sum, this is not a 
book to be read for the answers it provides, 
but rather the questions it poses. Those in 
search of a primer on behavioural econom-
ics or a collection of essential papers in this 
area will not be very well rewarded by this 
tome. However, a curious reader in search 
of a fresh angle or a different approach to 
a vexing problem may ﬁ nd some objects to 
reﬂ ect upon therein.
Sandy Ross
London School of Economics
s.ross@lse.ac.uk
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Like the other volumes reviewed in this 
section, this book addresses one of the ba-
sic social science questions: What kind(s) 
of human motivation underlie social col-
laboration? Foundations of Human Social-
ity represents a far-reaching endeavour to 
challenge the notion of homo economicus, 
which has been the cement of many inﬂ u-
ential social, economic, and political theo-
ries, as well as game theory, rational choice 
theory, and social exchange theory. This no-
tion entails a conception of human motiva-
tion whereby individuals are self-interest-
ed agents who strive to maximise their own 
utility from a given interaction, expecting 
others to do the same. In other words, they 
reveal a ‘self-regarding’ preference, or de-
sire, to collaborate with others only if the 
collaboration maximises their own utility 
gains. Against this understanding, Founda-
tions of Human Sociality suggests that self-
regarding preferences cannot satisfactorily 
account for frequent instances of pro-social 
behaviour, guided by ‘other regarding’ (so-
cial) preferences. By means of a complex 
laboratory enterprise that included obser-
vation of behaviour in both experimental 
and everyday life conditions, the contrib-
utors speciﬁ ed two main goals for exami-
nation. First, they aim to refute the homo 
economicus notion by showing that, when 
considering collaboration with others, indi-
viduals across different societies are de fac-
to also guided by social preferences, includ-
ing strong reciprocity and fairness. Second, 
they aim to identify socio-cultural and eco-
nomic conditions that shape self-interest 
and other kinds of social preferences. 
The homo economicus notion is em-
pirically refuted through an ambitious re-
search programme conducted by a group 
of scholars from different social science 
disciplines, including economics, anthro-
pology, psychology, and evolutionary bi-
ology. This research programme mainly 
leans on game theory, including variations 
of the Ultimatum Game, Public Goods 
Game and Dictator Game. As reviewed in 
Chapter 3 by Colin Camerer and Ernst 
 Fehr, these games generally assume that, 
when trying to meet their goals and de-
sires, individuals weigh different alterna-
tives (options) and their consequences and 
maximise a preference function. However, 
the book’s research makes a meaningful 
contribution by elaborating the following: 
First, it attempts to shed light on the issue 
of human motivation and social collabora-
tion from an interdisciplinary perspective. 
By crossing age-old disciplinary divides, 
the authors attempt to reach a more com-
prehensive understanding of the dynam-
ics of relations between the individual and 
society. This understanding is achieved not 
only by integrating different disciplinary 
views but also by using different method-
ologies. Speciﬁ cally, the chapters rely both 
on economic experiments and on ethnogra-
phy. This last method, which views culture 
in a more holistic form, unveils socio-eco-
nomic patterns of interaction in everyday 
life and was meant to ascertain to what ex-
